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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K.
DIKEOU, individually and as
the natural parents and heirs
of the estate of THEODORE
"TED" JAMES DIKEOU, deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 930182-CA

vs.
Oral Argument
Priority 15

MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D.,
JEFFREY S. OSBORN. M.D.. and
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH,
dba ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Appellee.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Appellants are not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations, whose interpretation
is determinative of the issues on appeal other than the provision
cited in appellants' opening brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED DR.
OSBORN'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF DR.
BUSHNELL, THE DIKEOUS' EXPERT.
This Court reviews conclusions of law for legal correctness
and gives no deference to the district court's judgment. Grover v.
Grover. 839 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); accord Scharf v.

BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Dr. Osborn claims that
an abuse of discretion standard of review should be applied to the
trial court's decision to strike Dr. Bushnell's affidavit, and
cites as support In re Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 436 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991); and Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744f 746 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). Both cases involved evidentiary rulings made at trial,
and are not applicable to evidentiary rulings made in considering
a motion for summary judgment.

Utah cases consistently apply a

non-deferential standard of review to all aspects of a ruling on
summary judgment, including evidentiary issues on which the trial
court might have discretion if the issue were raised at trial. See
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102-03 (Utah 1992).
Dr. Osborn asserts in his brief that the trial court properly
struck the affidavit of Dr. Bushnell because
(1) it failed to demonstrate that the affiant
was competent and capable to testify as to the
standard of care required of a cardiologist
specializing in electrophysiology such as Dr.
Osborn in this case; (2) the affidavit lacked
foundation, (3) it was based on hearsay, (4)
it did not demonstrate the same criteria exist
for cardiologists and emergency room medicine
physicians, (5) it was based on speculation,
and (6) it did not accurately state the evidence from the record.
(Appellee's Brief p. 30.)

None of these conclusions endures

analysis.
A.

Dr. Bushnell qualifies as an expert witness.

The first and fourth objections raised by Dr. Osborn are
essentially identical, and challenge Dr. Bushnell's qualifications
2

to testify concerning Dr. Osborn's malpractice. Utah law ordinarily requires expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases to
practice medicine in the same field as the physician against whom
they testify. See Burton v. Youncrblood, 711 P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah
1985) .

This rule has an exception.

An expert witness may

competently testify upon laying sufficient foundation to demonstrate that the expert's field of medical practice and the defendant's share a method of treatment—and thus, a standard of care.
See id.; accord Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993).
Dr. Bushnell's affidavit fits within this exception.

The

district court incorrectly focused on whether Dr. Bushnell belongs
to the same field of medical practice as Dr. Osborn. (R. 341) .
Plaintiffs' primary complaint against Dr. Osborn centers on his
decision not to personally examine Ted Dikeou on the night of
February 20-21, 1990. (See R. 5; Appellants' Br. at 12-13). So the
more accurate question is whether Dr. Bushnell can demonstrate
enough "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," Utah
R. Evid. 702, regarding the relationship between emergency room
physicians and primary physicians to competently testify whether
Dr. Osborn failed to meet the applicable standard of care when he
failed to treat Ted Dikeou personally.

(See R. 156-60).

Dr.

Bushnell's training as a specialist in emergency room medicine (R.
233, 239-40) amply qualifies him to speak on that question as an
expert. (See R. 235.) The relevant standard of care has nothing to
do with methods of treatment unique to cardiology or electrophysi-

3

ology.
which

Instead it has to do with a set of methods and duties with
Dr.

Bushnell

and

Dr. Osborn

are

equally

familiar:

the

relationship between a primary physician whose patient has checked
into a hospital and the emergency room physician who must treat
him.

Because Dr. Bushnell's affidavit demonstrates a sufficient

foundation of expertise in this area of common experience, skill,
and training, it fits within a recognized exception to the general
rule. See Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985).

In

this case, Dr. Bushnell does not need to practice cardiology to
qualify as an expert.
B.
Dr. Bushnell's affidavit contains sufficient foundation
to survive a motion to strike.
To survive a motion for summary judgment, experts' affidavits
must

contain

Butterfield

"factual

support

for

v. Okubo, 831 P.2d

the

97, 103

experts' conclusions.11
(Utah

1992)

(emphasis

added).
Dr. Bushnell noted the specific factual grounds on which he
based his opinions:
8.
I have reviewed the medical records
on Theodore James "Ted" Dikeou from the private practice of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and
from St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room for
the treatment rendered to Ted Dikeou on the
night of February 20-21, 1990.
9.
I have also read transcripts of the
depositions of Mrs. Helen Dikeou, Dr. Jeffrey
S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall.
10. Having read and studied the documents listed above, I have formed a professional opinion as to the standard of medical
4

care applicable Ii i this case ai id whether
Doctors Osborn and Dowdall adhered to that
standard of care in their treatment of Ted
Dikeou.
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!" the
. . . court

itself

admits, Dr. Bushnell's reliance on medical records and

deposition testimony is legally permitted.
D.
Paragraphs 11-2 3 of Dr. Bushnell's affidavit are neither
speculative nor factually incorrect.
An expert witness may rely on data "of a type reasonably
relied on by experts in the witness's field of expertise," Barson
v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984), and he is
qualified to testify by reason of his "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education . . . ." Utah R. Evid. 702.

Without

belaboring the point, Dr. Bushnell's affidavit evinces his careful
reading of the record and his long experience with emergency room
medicine.

To the extent Dr. Bushnell makes inferences, they are

based on the same experience and training that qualify him to
testify at all.

It would be contrary both to law and good policy

to ask an expert witness to state his opinions without making the
kinds of inferences that his experience equips him to make.

That

Dr. Bushnell's conclusions rely on such inferences is the natural
product of his work as an expert.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WHEN THERE REMAIN GENUINE ISSUES OP
MATERIAL FACT.
Summary judgment should be granted only when there are no
genuine issues of material fact, and an appellate court reviews a
grant of summary judgment for legal correctness, giving the district

court

no

particular

deference.
6

See

Transamerica

Cash

Resei
(Utah

^ ..

-

Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 21 # 25-26

~J*

ubi

inferences
Roll! ,

i/orable

^incr i .. y . . . . ••

1 M ** i *t ..

v_, Petersen, * * *- "J l •>•

v *'-v iacts and

malpractice

^

p

:

medical

provide expert witness
;;

testimony
dru UJL ca.

element-,
breach, causat

Intermountain Heaitn cait

npnce,

f

injury. See Hoopiiaina v.

.

m ^u. . .*•-.

Applying these principles •

; u^ in^;., .

1987) .

- ,-.i s case shows that

the d i strict court erred by granting summary judgment when there
remains a genua ne
A,

"in" in'i.d mr i.t I f fief .

ISMI* 1

The affidavit creates an issues of. tact regarding breach

of the standard of care.
T h e D i k e o u s h a v e iiia i iita n i c d
Dr.

Osborn's

failure

I

I OIII

1 o treat Ted Dikeou

death. (See R, h)
:M,,, L b r i e f t u I I M <

their
this cast

whether

their

Minpl.nnt o n w a r d

i n person caused Mr.

"They have repeated that clai m
I ti
L S S U e j_n

Dr. Osborn cou] i

•

should have made a

*" i on and diagnosis <t1 'he

per sc in fi 1

iecedent * s condition,
ncrqenc > room

rather than . . . ny '/oJely
physician. * ' (Appellants*
a

Br,
stixck

was properl
Dr.
Cisboin.

at:
-

!.<•>) ,
t

»*.*

-addressed by an py

Bushnell
in in

that

Because

Dr.

Bushnell 's

i l .uat issue of this case
^.

st.ates t * standard

- ~rpl icable to Dr.

ini n.) 'in" j paragraph Dr. Bushnell describes

7

the

night of February 2 0-21, 1990, Ted Dikeou's unusual arrhythmia, and
Dr. Osborn's response.
13. Dr. Osborn was aware of the unique nature of this
occurrence, and by his own testimony noted that this
prolonged episode warranted further testing, investigation and treatment of Ted Dikeou's prolonged tachycardia-a presentation made gravely ominous by Ted's known
diagnosis of Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome. This is the
standard of medical care which applies to Dr. Jeffrey
Osborn.
(R. 234) (emphasis added).

By this sentence Dr. Bushnell means

that Dr. Osborn's physician-patient relationship with Ted Dikeou,
combined with Dr. Osborn's awareness of the unusual threat posed by
Mr. Dikeou's tachycardia, obligated Dr. Osborn to pursue "further
testing, investigation and treatment . . . ." (Id.) The duty of a
primary physician to personally treat his or her patient is wellrecognized:
A physician, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, is, during the existence of the relationship of
physician and patient, under a duty to give to the
patient all necessary care as long as the case requires
attention, and an unwarranted lack of diligence in
attending the patient after assumption of the case for'
treatment renders the physician liable for damages. The
courts are in general agreement that this principle
properly states the test of care to be applied in
determining a physician's liability for lack of diligence
in attending a patient.
C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Liability of Physician for Lack of
Diligence in Attending Patient, 57 A.L.R.2d 379, 388 (1958).
Dr. Bushnell's affidavit squarely states that Dr. Osborn
breached this standard of care.
Despite his professional relationship with Ted
Dikeou and his awareness that further action on his part
was required, Dr. Osborn failed to appreciate the
8

seriousness of this occurrence, failed to investigate the
change in his patient's symptoms, failed to recommend
that Ted Dikeou meet him at the hospital where Dr. Osborn
has staff privileges and in general, failed to respond in
any manner to his patient's condition.
•-•tfii testimony verifies this version of
events, albeit
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:?"k's HospitaJ
I

before
event,

Mark*r- Hospital let iim see

Ted Dikeou and review Ted's records three days later1, (See R. 23536, 160).

This admission and the existence of feasible alterna-

tives leave Dr. Osborn without a defense for his inaction on the
night of February 20-21, 1990. Dr. Osborn breached his standard of
care.
B.

The affidavit establishes causation.

Dr. Osborn claims as an aside in his brief that plaintiffs'
failed to establish the element of causation.
pp. 27-28.)
of causation.

(Appellee's Brief

Dr. Bushnell's affidavit also states the key element
"Dr. Osborn suggested the administration of medica-

tion to Ted Dikeou that night [of February 20-21, 1990] without
confirming the condition for which he was prescribing, thereby
playing a major role in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his
subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death." (R. 235).
Dr. Bushnell's statement that Dr. Osborn prescribed medication
"without confirming the condition for which he was prescribing"
means that Dr. Osborn's failure to personally examine Ted Dikeou
caused Ted Dikeou's death. (See id.).

Dr. Osborn has admitted that

he would have prescribed something different than Verapamil if he
would have known Dr. Dowdall's diagnosis of paroxysmal

atrial

*Dr. Osborn self-servingly characterizes this visit as only a
social visit, but does not deny that he review Ted Dikeou's medical
chart while there. (Appellee's brief p. 3 6.) Mr. Dikeou account
of that occasion is that Dr. Osborn both "examined Ted" and "spent
some time talking to us about his condition as he saw it." (R.
162.)
Mr. Dikeou's version obviously controls for purposes of
summary judgment.
10

tachycardia
Dowdall]

(PAT) was incorrect.

had

mentioned

atrial

"Hypothetically, if he [Dr.
fibrillation

my

response

for

treatment would be—have been different than Verapamil." (R. 160).
By this statement Dr. Osborn admits that his failure to examine Ted
Dikeou personally led to the misprescription of Verapamil, which in
turn led to Ted Dikeou's early death.
Also, by
causation.

"exacerbation," Dr. Bushnell clearly refers to

Ted Dikeou had Wolff-Parkinson-White (WPW) syndrome

(See R. 157) , a cardiac disorder that can be controlled with proper
treatment. (See R. 155.) When Dr. Bushnell refers to Dr. Osborn's
inaction as "exacerbating" Ted Dikeou's condition, a reasonable
inference is that he means that the misprescription of Verapamil
exacerbated Ted Dikeou's WPW syndrome. (See R. 234-35).

This

statement establishes the necessary element of causation, linking
Dr. Osborn's breach of his standard of care with Ted Dikeou7s
death.
Given these statements from Dr. Bushnell7s affidavit, which
this Court must construe in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to Dr. Osborn's
role in Ted Dikeou's untimely death. The district court erred when
it granted summary judgment.
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POINT III
THE DIKEOUS DID NOT ADMIT THAT ONLY A CARDIOLOGIST COULD TESTIFY CONCERNING THE STANDARD OP
CARE APPLICABLE TO DR. OSBORN.
Both in its minute entry of April 17, 1992 and its summary
judgment of May 8, 1992, the district court said that the Dikeous
had

"patently

admitted

that

they

have

no

expert

to

provide

testimony necessary to show that Dr. Osborn's involvement in the
treatment of the decedent

. • . did not rise to the standard

required under Utah law in order for plaintiffs [the Dikeous] to
sustain their burden of proof."

(R. 341; R. 288)

Dr. Osborn

repeats this charge on appeal.
[P]laintiffs admitted under oath that plaintiffs believed
that the interrogatory concerning the substance of the
allegation against Dr. Osborn was "best answered by a
medical expert in the field of cardiology, and in
response [attach] a copy of a letter opinion from Michael
D. Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by Plaintiff's
attorney."
(Appellee's Br. at 37-38).
the passage that Dr. Osborn quotes should be considered in
context.

It occurs in Plaintiff Helen K. Dikeou's Answers to

Defendant Osborn's Interrogatories.

The interrogatory

and the

relevant part of Ms. Dikeou's answer appear below:
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: With reference to paragraph 20
of plaintiff's complaint, please state each and every
fact or basis upon which it is claimed that; (a) Dr.
Osborn was negligent in that he failed to properly
ascertain the true condition of the patient; (b) that he
failed personally to examine the patient and satisfy
himself concerning the diagnosis of Dr. Dowdall; (c) that
he mis-prescribed the medication to be given; and (d)
that he failed to promptly and properly respond to the
adverse conditions that developed to the patient after
12

hospital personnel followed his diagnosis and doctor's
orders.
ANSWER:
Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory as
it requires Plaintiff to make medical judgments beyond
the scope of her education, training and expertise.
Plaintiff believes that this Interrogatory is Jbest
answered by a medical expert in the field of cardiology,
and in response, attaches a copy of a letter opinion from
Michael D. Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by
Plaintiff's attorneys to evaluate the care given to
Theodore "Ted" Dikeou, and which opinion will be supplemented hereafter.
(R. 305-06) (emphasis added).
On its face, Ms. Dikeou's statement cannot be taken to mean
what the district court and Dr. Osborn say it means.
answered" does not mean "can only be answered."

"Best

The first phrase

indicates a preference, the second a requirement.

A fair reading

of Ms. Dikeou7s statement shows that she preferred Dr. Osborn to
rely on Dr. Lesh's letter rather than on her lay opinion.

To

construe Ms. Dikeou's preference as an admission that she has no
case without a cardiologist requires logic that not only leads, but
leaps.
Besides, even if Ms. Dikeou had clearly said that she thought
she needed a cardiologist to make out her prima facie case, her
statement should not have affected the court's decision.

Courts

have discretion to admit expert witness testimony based on the law,
not on a lay person's opinion.

The district court erred if it

permitted its misreading of Ms. Dikeou's statement to influence its
decision to strike Dr. Bushnell's affidavit.

13

POINT IV
DOCKETING STATEMENTS NEED NOT CONTAIN ALL
ISSUES THAT APPELLANTS RAISE IN THEIR BRIEF.
An

appellant waives

any

issue

not raised

in his

or her

appellate brief. See Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 n.4
(Utah

1992).

This rule, while reasonable

and

necessary

when

applied to briefs, is unduly harsh if applied to docketing statements.

Docketing statements serve five chief purposes.

They help

the appellate and supreme courts assign cases to the proper court,
decide when cases ought to be certified to the supreme court,
classify

cases

to

accurately

determine

their

priority,

grant

summary dispositions when proper, and make calendar assignments.
See Utah R. App. P. 9.

Given the 21-day time period within which

to file docketing statements, id. , requiring appellants to list all
issues serves neither the purposes for which docketing statements
are required nor the appellants, whose rushed attempt to provide a
complete

catalogue

of

issues

probably

would

result

in

poor

lawyering.
Dr. Osborn relies In Re Estate of Justheim, 824 P. 2d 432 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) , to support his argument that the Dikeous / issue has
been untimely presented.

There this Court understandably refused

to review an issue that had been presented neither to the trial
court, nor in the docketing statement, nor in the principal brief.
Id. at 437. In fact, the court determined that the party trying to
present the issue for its review had waived the issue at trial. Id.
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The facts of Justheim differ from the facts of this case in
nearly every detail.

The Dikeous challenged the lower court's

grant of Dr. Osborn's motion for filing of discovery responses. (R.
346-50).

While they did not list that issue in their docketing

statement, they raised and discussed it in their principal brief to
this Court. (See Appellants' Br. at 19-20).

Finally, because this

case was decided on the memoranda, see R. 287-89, 340-42, the
Dikeous had no trial at which to waive the issue they have
presented for review. Justheim does not apply, given these facts.
This Court should disregard Dr. Osborn's argument and review
the lower court's decision to supplement the record three weeks
after it granted summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's order striking Dr.
Bushnell's affidavit, vacate the summary judgment, and remand the
case for a jury trial on the merits.
DATED this

2<g **

day of August, 1993.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: ./
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSElP
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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